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C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 009989

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/IET

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2025

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SUBJECT: ACEH: KALLA BRIEFS ENVOYS ON "HIS" PEACE DEAL

REF: A. JAKARTA 9963 - HAMID CLAIMS BROAD ACCEPTANCE

[1](#)B. JAKARTA 9749 - INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF AGREEMENT

[1](#)C. JAKARTA 9685 - GOI AND GAM REACH AGREEMENT

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) The Ambassador and heads of mission from Australia, Finland, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK (also representing the EU) called on Vice President Jusuf Kalla on July 22 to receive the GOI's brief on the draft Aceh peace accord. Kalla's presentation echoed that of lead negotiator Hamid Awaludin the day before (ref A), though Kalla focused more heavily on the importance of international pressure on the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), including actions by the Malaysian government against the outspoken member of the GAM negotiating team living there. Kalla described an informal consultation process with key Parliament members prior to the August 15 signing, downplaying any domestic political opposition. The GOI and GAM are keeping close hold the specific number of GAM's weapons identified for decommissioning. The Vice President called on at least some of the international monitors to be in place by the end of August or early September. Kalla saw the need to work through initial reintegration issues first, which he acknowledged would be difficult, prior to launching into new elections. He anticipated several former GAM members sitting in the Aceh reconstruction board (BRR), and noted the need for up to 20,000 new homes. Kalla demonstrated his strong sense of ownership of the peace deal, and signaled that the GOI has begun serious thought on implementing the accord. End Summary.

Kalla Plays Up International Role

[1](#)2. (C) Vice President Kalla, accompanied by chief negotiators Hamid Awaludin and Sofyan Djalil, and Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, received the Ambassador and seven other envoys July 22 to review the draft Aceh peace agreement, his sixth such briefing of key diplomats in Jakarta since January. The Ambassador and his counterparts congratulated Kalla and the GOI on the tentative agreement, remarking that the GOI had kept to the schedule Kalla had outlined during the early days of the talks. Kalla in turn played up the international role in achieving this

breakthrough, praising the countries represented for their efforts in generating pressure on GAM, for example through joint demarches that convinced GAM that it had no alternative post-tsunami but to negotiate. The VP singled out Malaysia's actions, following his call to Deputy Prime Minister Najib, which included a police interview with the member of the GAM negotiating team living in Malaysia that convinced this GAM member to go along with other rebel leaders in support of a deal.

¶3. (C) Kalla was very complementary of Finnish facilitator Ahtisaari, who had pushed the talks forward in a constructive direction. He also gave credit to GAM's Australian advisor Kingsbury, who, if sometimes difficult, provided needed reassurance to GAM leaders during the talks.

¶4. (C) Like his negotiator Hamid, Kalla mentioned the December 2004 tsunami as another key factor that brought the two sides to the table. In addition, Kalla noted the GOI's early commitment to pursuing a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and one that was comprehensive, preserved GAM's dignity, and also respected Indonesian unity. This approach had proven successful.

TNI Chief a Strong Supporter

¶5. (C) On the Indonesian military (TNI), Kalla said TNI chief Endriartono Sutarto was very pleased by the deal and a strong supporter of the outcome. Sutarto much preferred to have his troops out of that conflict, and back and available for other duties.

Downplaying DPR Objections

¶6. (C) Kalla downplayed any difficulties in selling the agreement to the Parliament (DPR). The Vice President said he would conduct the consultation with the DPR on the issue of granting GAM members amnesty, and on other important points, by inviting key Parliamentarians for discussions in his home. Like Hamid, Kalla identified a revision of Aceh's special autonomy law as the single legislative action required, at least in the initial implementation phase (with the MOU calling for passage by March 2006 of a Law for the Governing of Aceh).

¶7. (C) The Vice President reviewed the general time frame for amnesty (to be granted within 15 days of the MOU signing), decommissioning GAM weapons and drawing down GOI security forces. Kalla stated that the GOI and GAM had noted in the MOU the specific number of GAM fighters to be demobilized and weapons to be decommissioned, but both sides were keeping these numbers very close hold. (Note: In addition to these figures, the numbers of TNI and police who would remain in Aceh also are not available in the text that we have, and these presumably fall in this same "close hold" category. End Note.)

Anticipating Problems in Reintegration

¶8. (C) The Vice President admitted that the reintegration process could face significant problems that would need to be worked out prior to holding new elections in Aceh. He expected that several former GAM members would take positions in the Aceh reconstruction body (BRR), which would be responsible for the bulk of the effort. (Comment: This is good news since the BRR has access to funds and expertise, along with a reputation for action and honesty. End Comment.) Some 10,000 to 20,000 new houses may need to be built as part of the reintegration package, Kalla offered. He noted that the GOI does not have a good estimate of the number of GAM members, and said GAM sympathizers in exile in Malaysia could number as high as 50,000, some of whom would return. (Comment: This estimate strikes us as unrealistically high. End Comment.) The reintegration effort would need to avoid creating social jealousy, and

could not treat ex-GAM members differently from their neighbors. Kalla provided little other detail about administering the reintegration effort.

Monitors to Start Arriving by August 30?

¶9. (C) Kalla stated that EU and ASEAN monitors should begin deploying in Aceh by August 30, or early September at the latest. Kalla noted the monitors' wide responsibilities covering all aspects of the MOU. (Comment: The UK deputy ambassador, who also represented the EU in this meeting, had mentioned privately that the EU had been scrambling to come to grips with the monitoring task. Only Sweden and curiously Switzerland had offered people for the monitoring role so far. End Comment.)

Police Training

¶10. (C) The Ambassador noted our plan to provide human rights training to an initial group of police instructors drawn from Aceh. He asked the Vice President to provide us with enough advance warning to consider and prepare for follow-on requests.

Comment

¶11. (C) Kalla took charge of this briefing, with Hamid Awaludin remaining largely silent. The Vice President demonstrated a confident grasp of the MOU, gave short shrift to suggestions of domestic political challenges, and recognized the reintegration process would face problems. Overall, the meeting demonstrated that the Vice President feels strong ownership over the peace deal, and that the GOI is now giving serious thought to the challenges of implementing their pending agreement with GAM.

PASCOE